Szczegóły publikacji

Opis bibliograficzny

Justifying groups in multiwinner approval voting / Edith Elkind, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong // W: Algorithmic Game Theory : 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Colchester, UK, September 12–15, 2022 : proceedings / eds. Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros Voudouris. — Cham : Springer Nature Switzerland, cop. 2022. — (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; ISSN 0302-9743 ; LNCS 13584. Advanced Research in Computing and Software Science). — ISBN: 978-3-031-15713-4; e-ISBN: 978-3-031-15714-1. — S. 472–489. — Bibliogr. s. 488–489, Abstr.

Autorzy (6)

  • Elkind Edith
  • AGHFaliszewski Piotr
  • Igarashi Ayumi
  • Manurangsi Pasin
  • Schmidt-Kraepelin Ulrike
  • Suksompong Warut

Dane bibliometryczne

ID BaDAP142806
Data dodania do BaDAP2022-10-26
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_27
Rok publikacji2022
Typ publikacjimateriały konferencyjne (aut.)
Otwarty dostęptak
WydawcaSpringer
KonferencjaInternational Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory 2022
Czasopismo/seriaLecture Notes in Computer Science

Abstract

Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown through experiments that the JR condition can typically be fulfilled by groups of fewer than k candidates, where k is the target size of the committee. In this paper, we study such groups—known as n/k-justifying groups—both theoretically and empirically. First, we show that under the impartial culture model, n/k-justifying groups of size less than k/2 are likely to exist, which implies that the number of JR committees is usually large. We then present efficient approximation algorithms that compute a small n/k-justifying group for any given instance, and a polynomial-time exact algorithm when the instance admits a tree representation. In addition, we demonstrate that small n/k-justifying groups can often be useful for obtaining a gender-balanced JR committee even though the problem is NP-hard.

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