Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Robustness among multiwinner voting rules / Robert Bredereck, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon // W: Algorithmic game theory : 10th international symposium, SAGT 2017 : L'Aquila, Italy, September 12–14, 2017 : proceedings / ed. Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini. — Cham : Springer, cop. 2017. — (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; ISSN 0302-9743 ; LNCS 10504). — ISBN: 978-3-319-66699-0; e-ISBN: 978-3-319-66700-3. — S. 80–92. — Bibliogr. s. 91–92, Abstr.
Autorzy (6)
- Bredereck Robert
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Kaczmarczyk Andrzej
- Niedermeier Rolf
- Skowron Piotr
- Talmon Nimrod
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 109103 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2017-10-13 |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_7 |
| Rok publikacji | 2017 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Wydawca | Springer |
| Konferencja | 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory |
| Czasopismo/seria | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Abstract
We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result.