Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Robustness among multiwinner voting rules / Robert Bredereck, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon // Artificial Intelligence ; ISSN 0004-3702. — 2021 — vol. 290 art. no. 103403, s. 1–29. — Bibliogr. s. 28–29, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2020-10-28
Autorzy (6)
- Bredereck Robert
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Kaczmarczyk Andrzej
- Niedermeier Rolf
- Skowron Piotr
- Talmon Nimrod
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 130951 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2020-11-06 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.artint.2020.103403 |
| Rok publikacji | 2021 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Czasopismo/seria | Artificial Intelligence |
Abstract
We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are with respect to small changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most one committee member might be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee will be replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms. Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps necessary to change the election result. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
