Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon // Social Choice and Welfare ; ISSN 0176-1714. — 2018 — vol. 51 iss. 3, s. 513–550. — Bibliogr. s. 547–550, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2018-04-19. — AAAI-2016 : the thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, February 12–17, Phoenix, Arizona, USA
Autorzy (4)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Skowron Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
- Talmon Nimrod
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 117135 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2018-10-12 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00355-018-1126-4 |
| Rok publikacji | 2018 |
| Typ publikacji | referat w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Creative Commons | |
| Czasopismo/seria | Social Choice and Welfare |
Abstract
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed-majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We show that, for many top-k-counting rules, the complexity of winner determination is high (formally, we show that the problem of deciding if there exists a committee with at least a given score is NP-hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.
