Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon // W: AAAI-16 [Dokument elektroniczny] : thirtieth AAAI conference on Artificial Intelligence : February 12–17 2016, Phoenix, Arizona USA / Association of the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Palo Alto : AAAI Press, [2016]. — e-ISBN: 978-157735760-5. — S. 482–488. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI16/paper/view/1209... [2016-04-29]. — Bibliogr. s. 488, Abstr.
Autorzy (4)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Skowron Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
- Talmon Nimrod
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 97559 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2016-05-10 |
| Rok publikacji | 2016 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | National Conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence 2016 |
Abstract
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We find that, for most of the rules in our new class, the complexity of winner determination is high (i.e., the problem of computing the winners is NP-hard), but we also show some examples of polynomial-time winner determination procedures, exact and approximate.
