Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Properties of multiwinner voting rules / Edith Elkind, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko // Social Choice and Welfare ; ISSN 0176-1714. — 2017 — vol. 48 iss. 3, s. 599–632. — Bibliogr. s. 630–632, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2017-01-30
Autorzy (4)
- Elkind Edith
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Skowron Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 105062 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2017-05-19 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00355-017-1026-z |
| Rok publikacji | 2017 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Creative Commons | |
| Czasopismo/seria | Social Choice and Welfare |
Abstract
A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a mapping that takes a collection of strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets of candidates of size k. In this paper we consider committee selection rules that can be viewed as generalizations of single-winner scoring rules, including SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, as well as several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations. We identify two natural broad classes of committee selection rules, and show that many of the existing rules belong to one or both of these classes. We then formulate a number of desirable properties of committee selection rules, and evaluate the rules we consider with respect to these properties.
