Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in Bucklin and fallback voting / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Yannick Reisch, Jörg Rothe, Lena Schend // Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems ; ISSN 1387-2532. — 2015 — vol. 29 iss. 6, s. 1091–1124. — Bibliogr. s. 1122–1124, Abstr.
Autorzy (4)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Reisch Yannick
- Rothe Jörg
- Schend Lena
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 93270 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2015-10-19 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10458-014-9277-x |
| Rok publikacji | 2015 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Czasopismo/seria | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems |
Abstract
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks. However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign-management problems for these two voting rules.
