Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in Bucklin and fallback voting : (extended abstract) / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Yannick Reisch, Jörg Rothe, Lena Schend // W: AAMAS 2014 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the 13th international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems : May 5–9, 2014, Paris, France / eds. Alessio Lomuscio, [et al.]. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [USA] : International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, cop. 2014. — e-ISBN: 978-1-4503-2738-1. — S. 1357–1358. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: http://aamas2014.lip6.fr/proceedings/aamas/p1357.pdf [2014-05-23]. — Bibliogr. s. 1358, Abstr.
Autorzy (4)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Reisch Yannick
- Rothe Jörg
- Schend Lena
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 81525 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2014-06-02 |
| Rok publikacji | 2014 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2014 |
Abstract
A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting) [1], control [7, 4], and bribery [5]. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks. However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign management problems for Bucklin and fallback. Copyright © 2014, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
