Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Algorithms for candidate control in sequential participatory budgeting rules : extended abstract / Šimon SCHIERREICH, Krzysztof SORNAT // W: AAMAS'2026 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the 25th international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems : Paphos, Cyprus, May 25–29, 2026. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [USA] : International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, cop. 2026. — e-ISBN: 979-8-4007-2317-9. — S. 3450–3452. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 3452, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2026-06-24. — Š. Schierreich - dod. afiliacja: Czech Technical University in Prague, Czechia
Autorzy (2)
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 168865 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2026-08-28 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.65109/SZOC7665 |
| Rok publikacji | 2026 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Creative Commons | |
| Konferencja | International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2026 |
Abstract
We study the problem of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. Our focus is on two prominent sequential welfare-based rules – GreedyAV and GreedyCost – which are widely used in practice. Candidate control asks whether we can strategically modify the set of available candidates so as to either ensure that a preferred candidate p is selected (constructive control) or prevent p from being selected (destructive control). Since all variants of candidate control under the two rules we consider are known to be NP-hard, we analyze the problems through the lens of parameterized complexity and approximability. Under the first lens, we provide a comprehensive classification with respect to natural parameters such as the number of voters, the number of controlled candidates, and the number of distinct costs, as well as their combinations. Within the second perspective, we establish a tight approximability bound.
