Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Participatory budgeting project strength via candidate control : extended abstracts / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Łukasz JANECZKO, Dušan Knop, Jan Pokorný, Šimon Schierreich, Mateusz Słuszniak, Krzysztof SORNAT // W: AAMAS'25 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the 24th international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems : May 19–23, 2025, Detroit, USA. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Richland : International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), cop. 2025. — e-ISBN: 979-8-4007-1426-9. — S. 2514–2516. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 2516, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2025-06-05
Autorzy (7)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- AGHJaneczko Łukasz
- Knop Dušan
- Pokorný Jan
- Schierreich Šimon
- AGHSłuszniak Mateusz
- AGHSornat Krzysztof
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 162672 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2025-09-19 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| Rok publikacji | 2025 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Creative Commons | |
| Konferencja | International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2025 |
Abstract
We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either adding or deleting candidates from the election (in the destructive setting, the goal is to prevent a given candidate from winning). We show that such control problems are NP-hard to solve for many participatory budgeting voting rules, including Phragmén and Equal-Shares, but there are natural cases with polynomial-time algorithms (e.g., for the GreedyAV rule and projects with costs encoded in unary). We also argue that control by deleting candidates is a useful tool for assessing the performance (or, strength) of initially losing projects.
