Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Committee scoring rules: axiomatic characterization and hierarchy / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon // ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation ; ISSN 2167-8375. — 2019 — vol. 7 no. 1 art. no. 3, s. 3:1–3:39. — Bibliogr. s. 3:36–3:39
Autorzy (4)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Skowron Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
- Talmon Nimrod
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 120410 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2019-06-04 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1145/3296672 |
| Rok publikacji | 2019 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Czasopismo/seria | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation |
Abstract
Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-Approval Chamberlin–Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.
