Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules / Piotr Skowron, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Arkadii Slinko // Journal of Economic Theory ; ISSN 0022-0531. — 2019 — vol. 180, s. 244–273. — Bibliogr. s. 272–273, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2019-01-09
Autorzy (3)
- Skowron Piotr
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 119836 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2019-05-30 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.011 |
| Rok publikacji | 2019 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Czasopismo/seria | Journal of Economic Theory |
Abstract
Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of candidates of a given size. We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules in the spirit of celebrated Young's characterization of single-winner scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms: symmetry, consistency, continuity and Pareto dominance. In the course of our proof, we introduce and axiomatically characterize multiwinner decision scoring rules, a class of rules that generalizes the well-known majority relation.
