Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
What do multiwinner voting rules do? : an experiment over the two-dimensional euclidean domain / Edith Elkind, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Jean-François Laslier, Piotr Skowron. Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon // W: AAAI-17 [Dokument elektroniczny] : thirty-first AAAI conference on artificial intelligence : San Francisco, USA, February 4–10, 2017. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [USA : s. n.], [2017]. — S. 494–501. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: http://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14924/13778 [2017-04-11]. — Bibliogr. s. 501, Abstr.
Autorzy (6)
- Elkind Edith
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Laslier Jean-François
- Skowron Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
- Talmon Nimrod
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 105067 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2017-05-19 |
| Rok publikacji | 2017 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | National Conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence 2017 |
Abstract
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules-SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV-for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.
