Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy / Jiehua Chen, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon // W: Proceedings of the twenty-ninth AAAI conference on Artificial intelligence [Dokument elektroniczny] : January 25–30, 2015, Austin, Texas, USA, Vol. 3. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [USA : AAAI Press], [2015]. — Dod. ISBN 978-1-57735-698-1. — e-ISBN: 978-1-57735-701-8. — S. 2045–2051. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: http://www.aaai.org/Press/Proceedings/aaai15.php [2015-06-10]. — Bibliogr. s. 2051, Abstr. — Pełny tekst dostępny po zalogowaniu
Autorzy (4)
- Chen Jiehua
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Niedermeier Rolf
- Talmon Nimrod
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 89621 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2015-07-07 |
| Rok publikacji | 2015 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | National Conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence 2015 |
Abstract
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters (that is, we take the number of voters as a parameter). We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks if a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding/deleting some candidates, and a combinatorial scenario where adding/deleting a candidate automatically means adding/deleting a whole group of candidates. Our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control (with the number of voters as the parameter) is much more varied than in the setting with many voters. © Copyright 2015, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaa1.org). All rights reserved.
