Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
How hard is control in single-crossing elections? / Krzysztof MAGIERA, Piotr FALISZEWSKI // W: ECAI 2014 [Dokument elektroniczny] : 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence : 18–22 August 2014, Prague, Czech Republic : including Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2014) : proceedings / eds. Torsten Schaub, Gerhard Friedrich, Barry O'Sullivan. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Amsterdam : IOS Press, cop. 2014. — Dysk Flash. — (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications ; ISSN 0922-6389 ; vol. 263). — Na dysku Flash dod. konferencja STAIRS 2014 : proceedings of the 7th European Starting AI Researcher Symposium / ed. by Ulle Endriss, Joao Leite. — Amsterdam : IOS Press. — (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications ; ISSN 0922-6389 ; vol. 264). — ISBN: 978-1-61499-420-6 ; e-ISBN: 978-1-61499-421-3. — ISBN: 978-1-61499-418-3; e-ISBN: 978-1-61499-419-0. — S. 579–584. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 584, Abstr. — Toż na stronie Internetowej : http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/37003 [2014-12-04]
Autorzy (2)
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 85094 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2014-11-05 |
| DOI | 10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-579 |
| Rok publikacji | 2014 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Czasopismo/seria | Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications |
Abstract
Election control problems model situations where some entity (traditionally called the election chair) wants to ensure some agent's victory by either adding or deleting candidates or voters. The complexity of deciding if such control actions can be successful is well-studied for many typical voting rules and, usually, such control problems are NP-complete. However, Faliszewski et al. [16] have shown that many control problems become polynomial-time solvable when we consider single-peaked elections. In this paper we show that a similar phenomenon applies to the case of single-crossing elections. Specifically, we consider the complexity of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters under Plurality and Condorcet voting. For each of these control types and each of the rules, we show that if the control type is NP-complete in general, it becomes polynomial-time solvable for single-crossing elections.