Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Swap bribery / Edith Elkind, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Arkadii Slinko // W: Algorithmic game theory : second international symposium, SAGT 2009 : Paphos, Cyprus, October 2009 : proceedings / eds. Marios Mavronicolas ; Vicky G. Papadopoulou. — Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag, cop. 2009. — ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; ISSN 0302-9743 ; LNCS 5814. Theoretical Computer Science and General Issues ; ISSN 0302-9743 ). — ISBN: 978-3-642-04644-5; ISBN: 3-642-04644-4; e-ISBN: 978-3-642-04645-2. — S. 299–310. — Bibliogr. s. 310, Abstr.
Autorzy (3)
- Elkind Edith
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 48600 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2009-11-23 |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_27 |
| Rok publikacji | 2009 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Czasopisma/serie | Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Theoretical Computer Science and General Issues |
Abstract
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates. Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this model, which we call swap bribery, for a broad class of voting rules, including variants of approval and k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin. © 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
