Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Computing equilibrium nominations in presidential elections / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Stanisław KAŹMIEROWSKI, Grzegorz Lisowski, Ildikó Schlotter, Paolo Turrini // W: AAAI-26 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the 40th annual AAAI conference on Artificial Intelligence : thirty-eighth conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence : sixteenth symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence : January 20-27, 2026, Singapore / eds. Sven Koenig, Chad Jenkins, Matthew E. Taylor ; Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Washington, DC, USA : AAAI Press, cop. 2026. — ( Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence ; ISSN 2159-5399 ). — e-ISBN: 978-1-57735-906-7; e-ISBN: 1-57735-906-2. — S. 16871-16879. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 16878-16879, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2026-03-14. --- Publikacja w części Technical Tracks 20. — S. Kaźmierowski - dod. afiliacja: University of Warsaw, Poland
Autorzy (5)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- AGHKaźmierowski Stanisław
- Lisowski Grzegorz
- Schlotter Ildikó
- Turrini Paolo
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 166811 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2026-04-01 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38732 |
| Rok publikacji | 2026 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | National Conference of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence 2026 |
| Czasopismo/seria | Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Abstract
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We introduce a new restriction on these preferences, which we call party-aligned single-peakedness: all voters agree on a common ordering of the parties along an ideological axis, but may differ in their perceptions of the positions of individual candidates within each party. The preferences of each voter are single-peaked with respect to their own axis over the candidates, which is consistent with the global ordering of the parties. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing whether a preference profile satisfies party-aligned single-peakedness. In this domain, we give polynomial-time algorithms for deciding whether a given party can become the winner under some (or all) nominations, and whether this can occur in some pure Nash equilibrium. We also prove a tight result about the guaranteed existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for elections with up to three parties for single-peaked and party-aligned single-peaked preference profiles.
