Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Dependencies of the European Union and the world on Russian nuclear fuel cycle services, and how to reduce them / Nils Haneklaus, Tomáš Vlček, Andrej Nosko, Hendrik Brink, Jakub Ochmann, Anna Skorek-Osikowska, Paweł GŁADYSZ, Paweł GAJDA, Matúš Mišík, Łukasz Bartela // Energy Strategy Reviews ; ISSN 2211-467X . — 2025 — vol. 62 art. no. 101923, s. 1-11. — Bibliogr. s. 9-11, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2025-10-01
Autorzy (10)
- Haneklaus Nils
- Vlček Tomáš
- Nosko Andrej
- Brink Hendrik
- Ochmann Jakub
- Skorek-Osikowska Anna
- AGHGładysz Paweł
- AGHGajda Paweł
- Mišík Matúš
- Bartela Łukasz
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 166123 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2026-03-11 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.esr.2025.101923 |
| Rok publikacji | 2025 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp | |
| Creative Commons | |
| Czasopismo/seria | Energy Strategy Reviews |
Abstract
While the European Union (EU) and other Western nations are weaning themselves off the Kremlin's fossil energy resources, global nuclear energy producers remain closely tied to Russia's nuclear industry. One in four nuclear reactors worldwide is connected to Russia (either operating domestically, built abroad, or under construction using Russian technology), and relies on spare parts, maintenance, and fuel from state-owned Rosatom. Russia contributes approximately 6 % of global uranium production, 20 % of conversion capacity, 46 % of enrichment capacity, and 10 % of nuclear fuel fabrication capacity. This work explores the EU's and the global community's dependence on Russian nuclear fuel cycle services. In response to growing geopolitical tensions, particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU has taken steps to reduce this reliance and enhance self-sufficiency. Key measures include expanding uranium conversion capacity, increasing fuel production for VVER-440 reactors, and better utilization of existing enrichment infrastructure. Reducing Russia's influence is possible but will require long-term commitment, political determination, and acceptance of higher nuclear energy costs, especially for conversion and enrichment services. With continued effort, full independence from Russian nuclear fuel cycle services is considered achievable between 2030 and 2035.