Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Spoiler susceptibility in party elections / Daria Boratyn, Wojciech Słomczyński, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław SZUFA // W: ECAI 2025 [Dokument elektroniczny] : 28th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence : 25–30 October 2025, Bologna, Italy : including 14th conference on Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2025) : proceedings / ed. by Inês Lynce, [et al.]. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Amsterdam : IOS Press : Sage, cop. 2025. — ( Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications ; ISSN 0922-6389 ; vol. 413 ). — e-ISBN: 978-1-64368-631-8. — S. 3775–3782. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 3782, Abstr. — S. Szufa - dod. afiliacja: CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL, Paris, France
Autorzy (4)
- Boratyn Daria
- Słomczyński Wojciech
- Stolicki Dariusz
- AGHSzufa Stanisław
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 164024 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2025-12-02 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.3233/FAIA251258 |
| Rok publikacji | 2025 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Creative Commons | |
| Wydawcy | IOS Press, SAGE Publications |
| Konferencja | European Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2025 |
| Czasopismo/seria | Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications |
Abstract
An electoral spoiler is usually defined as a losing candidate whose removal would affect the outcome by changing the winner. So far, spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily for single-winner electoral systems. We consider this subject in the context of party elections, where there is no longer a sharp distinction between winners and losers. Hence, we propose a more general definition, under which a party is a spoiler if their elimination causes any other party’s share in the outcome to decrease. We characterize spoiler-proof electoral allocation rules for zerosum voting methods. In particular, we prove that for seats-votes functions only identity is spoiler-proof. However, even if spoilers are unavoidable under common electoral rules, their expected impact can vary depending on the rule. Hence, we introduce a measure of spoilership, which allows us to experimentally compare a number of multiwinner social choice rules according to their spoiler susceptibility. Since the probabilistic models used in COMSOC have been developed for nonparty elections, we extend them to generate multidistrict party elections.
