Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Participatory budgeting project strength via candidate control / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Łukasz JANECZKO, Dušan Knop, Jan Pokorný, Šimon Schierreich, Mateusz Słuszniak, Krzysztof SORNAT // W: IJCAI-25 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the thirty-fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence : Montreal, Canada, 16-22 August 2025 : with satellite event in Guangzhou, China 29-31 August 2025 / ed. James Kwok. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [Canada] : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, cop. 2025. — e-ISBN: 978-1-956792-06-5. — S. 3821–3829. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/0425.pdf [2025-10-22]. — Bibliogr. s. 3828–3829, Abstr.
Autorzy (7)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- AGHJaneczko Łukasz
- Knop Dušan
- Pokorný Jan
- Schierreich Šimon
- AGHSłuszniak Mateusz
- AGHSornat Krzysztof
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 163738 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2025-11-06 |
| DOI | 10.24963/ijcai.2025/425 |
| Rok publikacji | 2025 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2025 |
Abstract
We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either adding or deleting candidates from the election (in the destructive setting, the goal is to prevent a given candidate from winning). We show that such control problems are NP-hard to solve for many participatory budgeting voting rules, including Phragmén and Equal-Shares, but there are natural cases with polynomial-time algorithms. We also argue that control by deleting candidates is a useful tool for assessing the performance (or, strength) of initially losing projects, and we support this view with experiments on real-life PB instances.
