Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
An experimental comparison of multiwinner voting rules on approval elections / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Martin Lackner, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław SZUFA // W: IJCAI-23 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the thirty-second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence : Macao, SAR, 19-25 August 2023 / ed. by Edith Elkind. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Darmstadt : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, cop. 2023. — (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence ; ISSN 1045-0823). — e-ISBN: 978-1-956792-03-4. — S. 2675–2683. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 2682–2683, Abstr.
Autorzy (4)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Lackner Martin
- Sornat Krzysztof
- AGHSzufa Stanisław
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 148800 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2023-09-27 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.24963/ijcai.2023/298 |
| Rok publikacji | 2023 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Czasopismo/seria | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Abstract
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from several distributions, we analyze how similar are the committees provided by prominent voting rules. Our results can be visualized as maps of voting rules, which provide a counterpoint to a purely axiomatic classification of voting rules. The strength of our proposed method is its independence from preimposed classifications (such as the satisfaction of concrete axioms), and that it indeed offers a much finer distinction than the current state of axiomatic analysis.