Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Bribery can get harder in structured multiwinner approval election / Bartosz Kusek, Robert Bredereck, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Andrzej KACZMARCZYK, Dušan Knop // W: AAMAS'23 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the 2023 international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems : May 29 - June 2, 2023, London, UK / eds. A. Ricci [et al.] ; ACM In-Cooperation, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [USA] : ACM DL ; International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), cop. 2023. — e-ISBN: 978-1-4503-9432-1. — S. 1725-1733. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Bibliogr. s. 1733, Abstr. — Session 5C: Voting I. --- Publikacja dostępna online od: 2023-05-30
Autorzy (5)
- AGHKusek Bartosz
- Bredereck Robert
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- AGHKaczmarczyk Andrzej
- Knop Dušan
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 147207 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2023-06-13 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| Rok publikacji | 2023 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Wydawca | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) |
| Konferencja | Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |
Abstract
We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limited by a budget. We assume our elections to either have the candidate interval or the voter interval property, and we require the property to hold also after the bribery. While structured elections usually make manipulative attacks significantly easier, our work also shows examples of the opposite behavior. We conclude by presenting preliminary insights regarding the destructive variant of our problem.