Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Multiwinner rules with variable number of winners / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon // W: ECAI 2020 : 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence : 29 August–8 September 2020, Santiago de Compostela, Spain : including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence (PAIS 2020) : proceedings / eds. Giuseppe de Giacomo, [et al.]. — Amsterdam ; Berlin ; Wahington : IOS Press BV, cop. 2020. — (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications ; ISSN 0922-6389 ; vol. 325). — ISBN: 978-1-64368-100-9; e-ISBN: 978-1-64368-101-6. — S. 67–74. — Bibliogr. s. 74, Abstr.
Autorzy (3)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Slinko Arkadii
- Talmon Nimrod
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 130589 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2020-10-13 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.3233/FAIA200077 |
| Rok publikacji | 2020 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Creative Commons | |
| Wydawca | IOS Press |
| Konferencja | European Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2020 |
| Czasopismo/seria | Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications |
Abstract
We consider voting rules for approval-based elections that select committees whose size is not predetermined. Unlike the study of rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning candidates, the study of rules that select a variable number of winners has only recently been initiated. We first mention some scenarios for which such rules are applicable. Then, aiming at better understanding these rules, we study their computational properties and report on simulations regarding the sizes of their committees. © 2020 The authors and IOS Press.
