Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Egalitarian committee scoring rules / Haris Aziz, Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Bernard Grofman, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon // W: IJCAI-18 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the twenty-seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence : Stockholm, 13-19 July 2018 / ed. by Jérôme Lang. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — [Stockholm] : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, cop. 2018. — e-ISBN: 978-0-9992411-2-7. — S. 56–62. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0008.pdf [2018-10-05]. — Bibliogr. s. 62, Abstr.
Autorzy (5)
- Aziz Haris
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Grofman Bernard
- Slinko Arkadii
- Talmon Nimrod
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 117127 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2018-10-12 |
| Rok publikacji | 2018 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Konferencja | International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018 |
Abstract
We introduce and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees—as is done in the utilitarian variants— the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter. We focus on five rules, which are egalitarian analogues of SNTV, the k-Borda rule, the Chamberlin–Courant rule, the Bloc rule, and the Pessimist rule. We establish their computational complexity, provide their initial axiomatic study, and perform experiments to represent the action of these rules graphically.
