Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Between proportionality and diversity: balancing district sizes under the Chamberlin-Courant rule / Piotr FALISZEWSKI, Nimrod Talmon // W: AAMAS 2018 [Dokument elektroniczny] : 17th international conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems : July 10-15, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden : proceedings. — [Stockholm] : International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, cop. 2018. — (AAMAS Conference proceedings ; ISSN 2523-5699). — e-ISBN: 978-1-4503-5649-7. — S. 14–22. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: http://ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2018/pdfs/p14.pdf [2018-10-05]. — Bibliogr. s. 22, Abstr.
Autorzy (2)
- AGHFaliszewski Piotr
- Talmon Nimrod
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 117123 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2018-10-12 |
| Rok publikacji | 2018 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp | |
| Konferencja | International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2018 |
| Czasopismo/seria | AAMAS Conference proceedings |
Abstract
The Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant (CC) multiwinner rules proceed by partitioning the voters into virtual districts and assigning a unique committee member to each district, so that the voters are as satisfied with the assignment as possible. The difference between Monroe and CC is that the former creates equal-sized districts, while the latter has no constraints. We generalize these rules by requiring that the largest district can be at most X times larger than the smallest one (where X is a parameter).We show that our new rules inherit worst-case computational properties from their ancestors; evaluate the rules experimentally (in particular, we provide their visualizations, analyze actual district sizes and voter satisfaction); and analyze their approximability.