Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
Credibility of threats to jam anonymous traffic remapping attacks in ad hoc WLANs / Jerzy Konorski, Szymon SZOTT // IEEE Communications Letters ; ISSN 1089-7798. — 2017 — vol. 21 no. 3, s. 624–627. — Bibliogr. s. 627, Abstr. — Publikacja dostępna online od: 2016-12-14
Autorzy (2)
- Konorski Jerzy
- AGHSzott Szymon
Słowa kluczowe
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 104557 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2017-05-19 |
| Tekst źródłowy | URL |
| DOI | 10.1109/LCOMM.2016.2639483 |
| Rok publikacji | 2017 |
| Typ publikacji | artykuł w czasopiśmie |
| Otwarty dostęp | |
| Czasopismo/seria | IEEE Communications Letters |
Abstract
In ad hoc networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) by performing traffic remapping attacks (TRAs), i.e., by falsely assigning their traffic to a higher priority class, which can hurt honest stations’ QoS. To discourage the attackers, honest stations can announce their dissatisfaction with the perceived QoS. If such a threat fails, a costly data frame jamming defense can be launched. We analyze the arising noncooperative game in which the attackers decide whether to continue a TRA when threatened and honest stations decide whether to start jamming when the TRA is continued. Using a Maynard Smith setting, we prove that the threats are credible to a rational attacker, who will then refrain from playing the game and remain honest.