Szczegóły publikacji
Opis bibliograficzny
An observation on pure strategies in Security Games / Marek ADRIAN, Gianluigi Greco // W: FedCSIS 2022 [Dokument elektroniczny] : proceedings of the 17th conference on Computer Science and Intelligence Systems : September 4–7, 2022, Sofia, Bulgaria / eds. Maria Ganzha, Leszek Maciaszek, Marcin Paprzycki, Dominik Ślęzak. — Wersja do Windows. — Dane tekstowe. — Warszawa : Polskie Towarzystwo Informatyczne ; [Piscataway] : IEEE, cop. 2022. — (Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems ; ISSN 2300-5963 ; vol. 30). — Dod. ISBN 978-83-965897-1-2 (ART), ISBN 978-83-965897-0-5 (USB). — e-ISBN: 978-83-962423-9-6. — S. 501–504. — Wymagania systemowe: Adobe Reader. — Tryb dostępu: https://annals-csis.org/Volume_30/pliks/fedcsis.pdf [2022-10-06]. — Bibliogr. s. 504, Abstr.
Autorzy (2)
- AGHAdrian Marek
- Greco Gianluigi
Dane bibliometryczne
| ID BaDAP | 142913 |
|---|---|
| Data dodania do BaDAP | 2022-10-28 |
| DOI | 10.15439/2022F219 |
| Rok publikacji | 2022 |
| Typ publikacji | materiały konferencyjne (aut.) |
| Otwarty dostęp |  |
| Wydawca | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
| Konferencja | 2022 17th Conference on Computer Science and Intelligence Systems |
| Czasopismo/seria | Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems |
Abstract
Security Games have been used in several different fields to randomise the division of limited resources and thus maximise the possibility of securing a set of targets. For this very practical purpose it is natural to consider primarily on mixed strategies, but such focus omits some theoretical properties of the games discussed. In this paper we discuss the existence and properties of pure Nash equilibria in security games. We give an overview of the basic observations that can be made in this setting. We also recognize an interesting problem in a case with multiple players playing a security game asynchronously, propose an algorithm for finding a strategy for any given player in the mentioned case and prove that the strategy profile resulting from the algorithm is in fact a Nash equilibrium and, even stronger, a subgame perfect equilibrium. We think that these findings are a nice supplement of the practical approach to Security Games and allow to form new research questions.